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SUMMARY
With the introduction of floating exchange rates, the vari:biiity of
unanticipated exchange rate changes has increased dramatically.A small
forecasting industry has developed to provide information about future exchange
rates. From an academic viewpoint, it is of interest to examine some of the
statistical properties of these forecasts and to relate the forecast errors to
other fundamental economic variables in a model with rational behavior.
Second, from a more practical viewpoint, we woulu like to know if foreign
exchange forecasts are useful to decision makers.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an objective analysis which
addresses some of the above questions for a large sample of forecasts. On the
basis of the current research, we can draw several conclusions. First, most
advisory service forecasts are not as accurate as the forward rate in terms of
mean squared error. Second, judgmental forecasters are superior to econometric
forecasters for short—term forecasts; the relationship is reversed for longer—
term forecasts (one year). Third, two statistical tests indicate that the
fraction of "correct" forecasts is significantly larger than what would be
expected if the advisory services were only guessing at the direction of the
future spot rate. In this sense, the forecast services appear to demonstrate
expertise and usefulness. However, a full analysis of the risk—return oppor-
tunities available to advisory service users is still incomplete.
It should be cautioned that if the forward rate contains a risk premium,
then we expect advisory service models to beat the forward rate according to
the tests we have outlined. In this case we must measure speculative returns
relative to a risk measure. While advisory service forecasts may lead to
profits, they may not be unusual after adjusting for risk.
Richard M. Levich
New York University
Graduate School of Business
100 Trinity Place
New York, N.Y. 10006
(212) 285—61761.
I. Int.o4nction
With the introduction of floating exchange rates in the
early 1970's, the statistical variability of exchange rates
increased dramatically. These exchange rate cL13 were not
perfectly anticipated. Hence, the variability of unanticipated
exchange rate changes also increased. The more than five year
history of floating exchange rates has setn periods of both
relative calm and turbulence. In particular, during the last
year unanticipated exchange rate changes increased to unpreci-
dented high levels for many currencies (Levich 1978). In this
setting it is obvious that firms and investors could have
enjoyed higher earnings if they had more timely and accurate
information about future exchange rates.
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In the present floating rate period, accurate information
about future exchange rates appears to be a scarce resource and,
correspondingly, it has a high value. A small exchange rate
forecasting industry has developed.
2In general, these firms
sell information about future exchange rates. Their specific
methodology and products cover a wide range of possibilities.
Some firms rely on a strictly qualitative approach; others are
highly technical, utilizing simultaneous equation models, spectral
analysis, or catastrophe theory. The output from these models
may be a point estimate of the future spot rate, the quarterly
average for some future period, or possibly just the future
trend movement.
Forecasts play two important roles in economic analysis.
First, the ability to predict the consequences of changes in
underlying circumstances is an important part of economics as2.
a positive science. Analysis of economic forecasts is an
essential diagnostic check of the adequacy of a theory or
model. Second, economic decisions on consumption and
investment depend on information, which includes predic
tions of future events. Since the future value of economic
variables may be (currently) unobservable, economic agents
must rely on forecasts.
The motivation for this paper is o examine hypotheses
based on these two roles. First, from an academic view-
point, it is of interest to examine the adequacy of foreign
exchange forecasting models. Specifically,we would like to
determine (1) How accurate are professional forecasters, (2)
Do forecasters produce rational, unbiased forecasts, (3) Do
forecasters revise their predictions so that their forecast
errors are serially uncorrelated, (4) What fundamental factors
are associated with forecast errors, and CS) What determines the
heterogeneity of forecasts across advisory services. Second,
from a more practical viewpoint, we would like to know if foreign
exchange forecasts are useful to decision makers. Specifically,
we would like to examine (1) If the predictions of advisory
services are more accurate than the forward rate, (2) How the
accuracy of prediction varies across cinrency, forecasting hori-
zon, and time period as well as forecasting service and (3)
Whether the predictions of any forecasting service would have
resulted in unusual speculative profits. These two motivations
are, of course, highly complementary.2a.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an objective
analysis which addresses some of the above questions for a
large sample of forecasts. On the basis of the current re-
search, we can draw several conclusions. First, most advisory
service forecasts are not as accurate as the forward rate in
terms of mean squared error. Second, judgmental forecasters
are superior to econometric forecasters for short-term fore-
casts; the relationship is reversed for longer-term forecasts
(one year).Third, two statistical tests indicate that the
fraction of "correct" forecasts is significantly larger than
what would be expected if the advisory services were only
guessing at the direction of the future spot rate. In this
sense, the forecast services appear to demonstrate expertise
and usefulness. However, a full analysis of the risk-return
opportunities available to advisory service users is still
incomplete.
The paper continues in section II, where we present a
theoretical discussion of the conditions under which foreign
exchange forecasts are likely to convey valuable information.
In section III we discuss alternative techniques for evalua-
ting forecasts. The empirical analysis of recent exchange
rate forecasts is presented in section IV.3.
II. The Value of Information--rnrhouldYuEverPay for
a Forecast?
A. Efficient Market Theory and Expertise
A critical building block in microeconomic theory is the
role of prices in aggregating information. A substantial
literature in economics and finance deals with the process by
which information is reflected in prices and its consequences
for investors. In the most simple, frictionless, textbook
economy where information is freely available to all, it is
clear that no one will pay for information. Furthermore, there
will be no optimal strategy for firms or investors to follow;
each investment is fairly priced relative to its risk and the
available information.
In the real world, information is costly to collect. This
fact implies that production of information will be limited to
the point where the marginal cost and marginal benefit from an
additional unit of information are equalized. While information
may be costly to generate, there are enormous economies of scale
in the distribution of existing information (e.g., via news-
papers, television, or news wires). An implication of the
above is that investors may earn the competitive rate of re-
turn on their investment in information only if they have mono-
polis±ic access to th'e iiformation. Once the informationis publicly available (i.e., a public good),it is reflected
in prices and of no further value.
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The conventional wisdom..on the value of informationand
the existence of (forecasting) expertise seems tohave com-
pleted a cycle. At the risk of generalization,prior to the
1960's the predominant image of the financial community was
one of professionalism and expertisein picking winxiers. The
mid-1960's through the 1970's witnessed an explosion of aca-
demic and professional research testing the efficientmarket
hypothesis. The general impression left bythis literature
was that the performance record of many professionalstrategies
and many "insiders" did not surpass the performanceof naive
and low-cost alternative strategies for investment. As the
evidence favoring market efficiency accumulated, the valueof
professional expertise seemed to decline.Passive strategies
which emphasized low management fees and large diversification
gains seemed to dominate more active strategieswhich emphasized
forecasting individual stock returns.
However the extreme efficient markets view- -that prices
continuously reflect all available information and so superior
performance is not possible- -depends on a verystrict set of
assumptions.
8In the past few years, academic research has
attempted to explore models which relax some of these assump-
tions. The results are shifting the academic view back toward5.
a view more palatable to the financial community-i.e. there
do exist rational models of behavior in which investors will
seek out and pay for professional advice.
The early literature on market efficiency explicitly
recognized this point by grouping empirical research into weak,
semi-strong, and strong form tests to describe tests based on
various information sets--historical prices, public information,
and all available information.Several studies (Lone and
Niederhoffer 1968, Scholes 1972, McDonald 1973, and Jaffe 1974)
report evidence which suggests that insiders can and do earn
unusual returns relative to the market.
More recent research by Grossman and Stiglit: (1976)
has introduced an explicit cost for information.Costly
information implies that investors will not collect all infor-
mation, so markets will never be fully efficient (i.e. strong-
form). In the Grossinan/Stiglitz model, those who chose to be
informed earn higher profits than those who chose to remain
uninformed. But the greater profit is only to compensate for
the cost of information.As long as the information collection
industry is competitive with free entry and exit, there will be
no excess returns earned by collecting information. However, if
the information industry is not fully competitive, then informa-
tion takes on an "inside" character and excess returns are
possible.7.
While this is one explanation for investorpurchases
of information, there are at least twounanswered questions.
First, to the extent that the WSJtends to survey specific
analysts, these analysts shouldbe able to charge a higher
price since their recommendations (potentiallyand
initially) will receive a wider distribution.A second problem
is "selection bias!.' There is evidencethat those recommendations
which reach the WSJ have value, but how manyothers were not
selected? And how does the WSJ make itsselections? We may
be back in the )eynesian beauty contest.
Another recent approach to market efficiencywhjch allows
for some individuals to outperform themarket is developed in
Figlewski (1978a, 1978b). Traders inFiglewski's model have
heterogeneous information, but theyalso are allowed diverse
price expectations, risk aversion,predictive ability and
wealth. Based on these factors, tradersmake their investments
in perio4 1. Traders with superior (inferior)ability generally
incur an increase (decrease) in wealthin period 2. The
transfer of wealth ("dollar votes") towardtraders with superior
track records gives the market a dynamic propertyand long-run
tendency to full efficiency.
An implication of this analysis is thattraders with
superior ability earn unusual returnsrelative tO the mar-
ket. Once again, if there is a marketfor trading skills--
e.g. expertise can beincreased through schooling or on—the
job training--then the trader may earnonly the fair rate
of return based on his investment.6.
A recent study on the value of information is reported
by Lloyd-Davies and Canes (1978). The authors select the
Wall Street Journal and its "Heard on the Street" column for
their data base. This column summarizes information (e.g.,
earnings estimates, stock price projections) about specific
firmsrecentlyprepared by leading financial analysts. Lloyd-
Davies and Canes find that in the twenty days prior to the
Wall Street Journal publication, there is some small (but sig-
nificant) price movement in the direction projected by the
analyst, but the major (and significant) move comes on the
publication date.
Lloyd-Davies and Canes rationalize these results with
the following scenario. In the initial round, the financial
analysts' information and recommendations reach only a small
group of investors with limited capital. Because of portfolio
considerations, they will not commit a large fraction of their
capital to any single asset. In some sense, then, these insiders
stop short in placing a fair value on the asset because this
would add excessive diversifiable risk to their portfolios.
When the information is published in the Wall Street Journal,
more capital is attracted to the asset and the portfolio con-
straint is no longer binding. The asset price now"fully reflects"
the now public information. Those who paid for early access to
the information earn a return.8.
But if there is no market for expertise--e.g.traders are
endowed with non-transferable skills"then thetrader may
capture economic rents based onhis special endowment.
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B. Information in the Foreign Exchange Market
It is important to consider what types ofinformation
might be worth collecting in order toforecast exchange rates.
In this regard, it is interesting to contrasthow the produc-
tioit and distribution of information differsin the foreign
exchange market and the U.S. securities market.Since the
great majority of stock price variation is explained byfirm
specific and industry specific factors, information on these
variables is extremely important to investors. The Securities
Exchange Commission requires firms to report extensivedata
on their operations. Accounting procedures are largely
standardized. Brokers cannot act on inside information; they
must make it public. If information appears contradictory
or if rumors appear to be the cause of speculative price
movements, the SEC can suspend trading and require the firm
to make a clarifying statement.
In contrast, foreign exchange market behavior depends
mainly on country specific or world specific factors. These
factors may be determined by political forces rather than
market forces. There is no international watchdog agency to
promote the distribution of information. Institutions,
accounting standards, and accuracy of data vary greatly.
Traders rely on inside information and are not required to
publicize this information.9
Given the contrasting character of these market
institutions, it could be argued that a larger fraction
of information is publicly available in the stock market
than in the foreign exchange market. As a result, the
diversity of beliefs about individual currencies is likely
to be greater than the diversity of beliefs about individual
stocks.
Another important factor which pertains to currency
forecasting i5 the link between basic information and the
forecast. It is very often assumed that if all information
is efficiently reflected in today's forward rate then
the forward rate is the optimal, publicly available forecast
of the future spot rate (St+). This argument ignores the
possibility that a risk premium or transaction costs may
exist, so that the true forward-spot relationship is
(1)St+ t,n + + T+
wherePCX) is a risk premium which depends on other variables,
X.T.jsatransaction costs measure. is a random error
term.
If (1) is the correct relationship, then advisory services
should be expected to produce foiecasts which are more accurate
than the forward rate.As a result, users of these forecasts
will earn speculative returns, but it remains to be shown that
these returns are large relative to the risk incurred. This
is an important issue which will be brought up again in the
next section.10.
We conclude that credible models of market behavior
exist which allow for investments in information and yet
remain consistent with market efficiency. Theoryalso
permits investors to be endowed with a range of analytical
skills or to occupy preferred locations in the market, both
of which characteristics may. not be tradeable. There are
clearly numerous examples of inside information leading to
unusual profits. However, it is by no means clear that the foreigfl
market
exchange /producesthe optimal amount of information- -or
equivalently, whether additional investments in information
will lead to a profit.
III. Analyzing Foreign Exchange Forecasts
Theanalysisof foreign exchange forecasts is a tricky
procedure. Without direct information on the costs of
forecasting errors or on the investor's utility of wealth,
there is not a uniform procedure for analyzing different
forecasting methods. There is agreement that, in some sense,
the forecast should "beat the market." There are two general
approaches to determine if an advisory service possesses
"expertise? First, we can examine various statistical pro-
perties of the forecast errors. Second, we cancalculate
the speculative returns earned by using the forecast.11.
Statistical Analysis of Forecast Errors
Under a broad range of conditions, a ccarison of simple stry
statistics can be used todistinguishforecasts. For example, to maximize
utility, investors with a syimnetric linear lossftuction should se-
lect the forecast with the mininu. mean absolute errorwhile investors
with a symeetric quadratic loss fmction should selectthe forecast with
the mininn mean squared forecast error. However,the investor' $loss
ftction may be asymetric or discontinuous at a pointin time(e.g.the
investor welcomes profits but camot lose more than someamo*mt with-
out losinghis job or declaringban1tcy) or it can be variable over
tine (e.g. small lossesovernine consecutive periods are acceptable
as long as the investor is positioned tocatch the big exchange rate
move in period ten). In these latter cases,other criteria aply for
selecting a forecasting model.
Figire 1 illustrates a potential pitfallif forecasts are judged
on thebasisof mean or mean squared errors. Assi.mte today'sforward
rate is $2.00 and t alternative forecastsof the future spot rate are
andS2—$2.08. If the actualspot rate turns out to be $2.02,
thesecoth forecast(S2)is superioreventhough it resultedina larger
forecasterror because itadvised investors to take longandprofitable
forward sterling positions.
Consequently, when investors are interested onlyin
the sign of their profits the fractionof periods where the
forecastcorrectly predicts only the direction of movement
in the exchange rate, becomes avalid criterion for judging
forecasts.Direction can be defined relative to the current




Figure 1: Illustrating a Pitfall in Forecast Error Analysis




decision variable. (e.g. the forward rate plus a risk premium
as in (1) ).Ananalysis of direction relative to the current
forwardratewould be a conservative test if the market price
includes a risk premium.
We can construct the following test. We wish to estimate
the probability (p) of correct advice in any period and then to
infer whether this probability is greater than one-half. More
formally, we are testing
12
H0: p0.5 (advisory servicehas no expertise)
H1: pO.5 (there is forecasting expertise)
For example, in a sample of n—100 observations, assume that
the advisory service produces r60 correct forecasts. The pro-
bability (p1) that this 60% track record could haveoccurred
under the null hypothesis is 2.3w. Therefore pA_r/n is one measure
of forecasting expertise and p1 is a measure of our confidence
that p is greater than 0.5. (the type I error probability).
In addition, we can calculate the probability (p2) that we
judge a service to have no expertise (p<O.S) giventhat the
true probability is p0.6. The probability (p2)therefore is
the chance of incorrectly failing to reject the null hypothesis
(the Type II error probability)13.
Speculative Return arid Risk
Although the previous techniques mayoffer conservative tests
for forecasting expertise, it is notrealistic to asstuce that investors
are interested only in the expectedsi of their profits. The expected
value of profits and higher entsof the distribution may also play a
role. A stronger test of forecasting expertiseis to cupare the perfor-
nce we would have obtained usingthe forecast relative to the perfor-
mance of an al rnative approach.The forecast is useful if it improves
the investor' s return/risk ratio.
The terms "return" and "risk" require specialattention as they
apply to the forei exchangemarket. If the investor uses the fore-
cast for forward speculation, his an%nitof profit will be
(2) XW -
whereX- ntmiberof forward contracts
W •weight(+1 •forwardpurchases; -l •forwardsales).
The rate of return - whereM is the fracticn required
for margin. Withat loss of generality we can assmethat M •1so that
the rate of return is
(3) ii -
Ifthe investor choses to speculate in the spotmarket by taking a
lg position in 04, for example,he ist first borrow U.S. dollars, paying
the cost •14The investor now purchases 24 in the spotmarket (at the
rate 1/Se), Invests the 24 to return 1.24and sells the entire proceeds in
the future at rate S,1.Theinvestor's rate of return in excess of costsis14.
-.a
(4)S1 (] +i)/ S. (j.+ i)
When the interest rate parity theory holds so that PJS— +
andin the case where W1, expressions (3) and (4) are equal. The
equality between spot and forward speculation is well latown (Tsiang, 1959),
but this exposition highlights that any positive return in (3) or (4) is
w2usual, since the cost of the invesent has already been netted out.
In the case where the cost i reflects the risk of the proposed foreii
exchange speculation, the profit is wuisual in a risk adjusted sense also.15
Ideally, we would lilce to loiow the risk adjusted cost of capital
for speculation (i.e. open positions) in the foreii exchange market.
In this case we could make a direct test for niusual returns based on ad-
visory service forecasts. However, general equilibrii. nde1s for pricing
forei exchange risk are still open to considerable dispute, so we
mi3t consider more heuristic alternative approaches.16
One approach is to calculate a series of speculative returns
and to measure the covariability of these returns with some market port-
folio. Roll and Solnik use this approach and adopt a basket of currencies
as the market portfolio. The covariance statistic provides a measure of
the systatic risk of a currency position. In this framework, speculative
returns are nmsual if they are (1) large relative to transaction costs,
(2) large relative to a risk measure, and (3) consistent over tne.




thatan investor could earn over N periods if he had perfect information
in every period. Levich shows that the ratio15.
N N
(6) H —£W4(S14-F. )/ lFtt
i—i.,'b,.'
hasexpected value (2p-1) and variance 4p(1-p)/n where pis theprobability
of choosg Wcorrectlyin any period and n is the ntmber of independent
sasle observations. For exan1e, a forecast which leads to the correct
position in half of the periods has p-0.5 and E (H) -0.0. ?IUnusualt*prof its
correspond to the case where H is greater than zero orpis greater than
one-half.17
Discussionof these Procedures
Statistical analysis offoreignexchange forecasts veryoftenwill
compare their results with the fotward rate. This assi.nes that thefor-
wardrate has sante desirable property- -thatit is imbiased ortheminmmLmt
?'EE forecast which is publicly available. Research reported by Bilson
and Levich (1977) and Cornell (1977) caimot reject this assumption. How-
ever, an alternative hypothesis--that the foard rate reflects a risk
preaiue which is highly volatile and changes sign--is also consistent with
the data. Inthis second case,the forward rate isnot a ni MSE
forecastand we uld not expect itto have a smaller MSE than forecasts
published by professional analysts.
Asecondissue relates the investor use offorecaststo their analysis.
Veryoften,cretcy analysts generate forecasts on a currency-by-ctnrency
basis. Furthermore, the analysis of these forecasts and advice on how to
utilize then are often also organized by individual currencies. Md
typie2lly, exchange rate cthmiges are not perfectly correlated. Itseens
therefore,that arency forecasts and their analysisoften encourage
currency-by-currencythinking.Indevelopingthis argimnt, Maktn (1978)16,
suggests that firms which concentrate on individual currencies
may be sacrificing important diversification gains. Granting
thatintheory shareholders can diversify exchange risk by themselves,
Makin argues that the revealed preference of financial managers is
adainently in favor of risk reduction. This. suggests that currency
forecasts be anayized as a group and not individually.
IV. Empirical Methodology and Results
A. Data Description
In this section we will analyze currency forecasts provided by
nine leading foreign exchange advisory services. While several of
these services have given permission to have their names attached to
their empirical results, the identity of the advisory service is not
important for, the purpose of testing our null hypotheses on forecast
accuracy and the availability of unusual speculative returns.
Therefore, I have elected to refer to the advisory services only by
number.
The forecasts and the services display a wide range of
characteristics which will make data computations and statistical
comparisons somewhat difficult. For example, some services produce
a quarterly average forecast for one to six or eight quarters ahead;
other seririces report an end-of-month forecast for the next four
quarters. Some services adhere to a strict production schedule and
publish forecasts at regular one-month intervals; other services
follow a less strict time schedule and publish forecasts at
irregular intervals ranging from three weeks to, say, eight or nine
weeks. So*. of the characteristics of the advisory services in our17.
sample are summarized in Table 1.
A second important set of data for this study is the time
series of spot and forward exchange rates which we use for the
standard of prediction performance. For this purpose we use the
Harris Bank Weekly Review which reports the closing bid prices for..
spot exchange, and one-, three-, six-, and twelve-month forward
18
contracts for nine major currencies. This data set begins in
January 1967 and contains 626 weekly observations through
February 2, 1979.
B. Research Methodology
There are several important methodological issues which must
be discussed before we proceed to discuss the results. The first
issue involves the time or date of the forecast. For example, a
service may run their computer model on January 12 Ct ).The
1
forecasts are combined with other data for a published report
dated January 19 Ct ).Finally,the report is mailed to sub-
2
scribers who receive it on January 26 Ct ).Toanalyze a forecast
3
we need to know the horizon (i.e. how many weeks ahead we are
forecasting) which implies that we must know the forecast date. Is
it t ,, ort ? For academic purposes, we should chose t ,because
1 2 3 1
the service used only information available at t to make its
1
forecast. However, for practical investment purposes, we cannot use
the forecast until t,andso we should calculate speculative returns
3
based on the transactions we can make at t,butstill recognize that
3
the forecast date is t
1
In this paper, our calculations assume that the forecasts are
effective on t and that subscribers can then transact at prices
1
prevailing on the fo.lowing Friday. We require this assumption18.
because our spot and forward exchange rate data are end-of-week
prices.
A second methodological problem arises from the fact that many
services generate a quarterly average forecast. While we can calculate
the average spot exchange rate in a quarter to suggest a measure of
forecasting accuracy, we cannot easily use this statistic to
measure the accuracy of the servicerelativeto some other predictor
(e.g., the forward rate) or to measure the speculative profits
available by using the forecasts. We therefore elect to convert
the quarterly average forecasts into a set of point estimates of the
future spot rate at various horizons.
Our procudure is to assume that the quarterly average forecast
corresponds to the point forecast for the midpoint of the quarter.
For example, let quarters I, II, III, and IV for a given year
correspond to weeks 1-13, 14-26, 27-39, and 40-52, respectively.
Quarterly average forecasts for these quarters are assumed to cor-
respond to point forecasts for weeks 7, 20, 33, and 46, respectively.
Given the current spot rate, we use linear interpolation to calculate
the implied 4, 13, 26, and 52 week ahead forecasts. We chose these
dates to be consistent with the term structure of forward rates
provided by the Harris Bank Weekly Review.
An example of this procedure is illustrated in Figures .
Whenpoint estimate forecasts -- say,one month ahead or end of
quarter --areprovided directly by the service, we can use linear
interpolation directly to calculate the implied term structureof
forecasts.
Consistent with our remarks in section III, the analysis









Tturs3: CotatructLoof Point Toecssti (S) from QuarterLy Averale Torecuts.19.
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whereS is the future spot rate, S is the n-period ahead
t+n t,n
forecase made at time t,andE is the resulting error. Note
t,n
that the errors are indexed by the point in time when the forecast
is made (t)ratherthan the time when the result is realized (tn).
To calculate speculative returns, we select the weights
according to a simple criterion:
1iifS
) t,nt,n
A t(-1 ifS <F
t,nt,n
The decision to invest a lumpsum amountsuggests that our investors
are risk neutral and consider each currency individually orform
equally weighted currency portfolios. If investorstake into account
other factors (e.g., the magnitude S -F ,thestandard error of
A t,flt,fl
the forecast S or the correlation of forecast errors across
t,n
currencies), a different set of weights would result.
C. Empirical Results
In the current version of this paper, our analysis is
restricted to the entire sample period for each advisory service.
Since the time period and sample size are not comparable for all
advisory services (see Table 1), it is not valid tomake direct
comparisons of the results across currencies.
The empirical results of this study are summarized in Tables
2-6. Table 2 reports the ratio
RatioMSE (advisory servic forecast) M a'20.
where the mean squared errors (MSE) arecalculated over the same
sample period. Values of "Ratio"less (greater) than 1.0
suggest that the advisory serviceforecast was more (less)
accurate than the forward rate prediction.The results
indicate that most values of "Ratio" are greaterthan 1.0,
ranging from 53% of the entries in thethree-month panel to 71% of
the entries in the six-month panel.
However, several services indicate a pattern acrosshorizons.
At the one-month horizon, services 5 and 9 generallyhave
smaller MSE than the forward rate, while service 1 has a greater
MSE for all currencies. At the twelve-month horizon, however,
this pattern is reversed, so that service 1 appears generally more
accurate than the forward rate while services 2, 5, and 9
generally have MSE greater than the forward rate.These results
suggest that judgmental forecasts may be moreaccurate in the
short-run and econometric forecasts may be more accuratein the
long-run.
Table 3 reports the mean speculative return earned by an
investor who followed a naive trading strategy using thefore-
casts. In the one-month panel, 72% of the entries are positive.
This percentage declines steadily to 46% positive entries inthe
twelve-month panel. Seven of the nine services are profitable at
the one-month horizon. At the twelve-month horizon, only two
services are profitable across all currencies; both of these
services use econometric forecasting methods.
The ratio of speculative profits to perfect information
profits (the H-statistic from equation 6) is reported in Table 4.
Note that as expected, the sign of the entries agree in Table 3 and21.
4. Only 14 of the entries (or 18%) in the one-month panel
report H greater than 0.6. These large H-statistics are
concentrated in services 3, 5, 8, and 9. In the twelve-month
panel, 12 of the entries (or 17%) are greater than 0.6. One-
half of these values are concentrated in service 1.
As we explained in section III, the H-statistic depends on
both correct prediction aid the distribution of speculative
returns. In order to concentrate on the prediction issue, we
calculate the fraction of forecasts which are correct relative to
theforwardrate.
Aper/n
where r —numberof correct forecasts
n —samplesize
Sample estimates ofare reported in Table 5. The calculations
are based on all sample observations (i.e. a dependent sample) in
order to get a more accurate estimate of the true.Foreach
service, the results are aggregated across currencies.
Table S suggests one result we have mentioned before; namely,
the equation based forecasts (services 1 and 3) appear to be more
accurate in the long-run while the judgmental forecasts (services
2,6,7,9) appear to lose accuracy with longer horizons. The Swiss
franc appears to be the most difficult currency to forecast as
most of the estimates ofare less than 50%. Using the same
criterion, the Italian lira appears to be the easiest currency
to predict. Service 9 appears to have the best overall record
at the one-month horizon, while service 1 appears to have the
best overall record at the longer horizons.
Our interest, however, is to determine if the values of
in Table 4 are unusual and indicate expertise. Our approach,22.
.-—. -
aswe described in Section ui, is to calculate the probability
(p1) of observing as many as Cr) correctforecasts out of (n)
observations, if the true probability of a correct forecast is
0.5. The test requires independent sampleobservations20.
The estimates of p1 are reported in Table 5. For example,
for service 6 the one-month Italian lira forecast was "correct"
in 16 of 22 independent periods. Under the null hypothesis
(p0.5), the probability of 16 or more correct forecasts in
22 periods is 1.6%. Similarly, for service 1 the six-month
German mark forecast was correct in 6 of 7 independent periods.
The probability of a track record this good or better is 6.2%.
Small values of p1 therefore indicate that the advisory service has
expertise in judging the direction of the future spot rate relative
to the current forward rate.
The results are also aggregated across all currencies. It is
not clear that this aggregated sample represents independent•
observations, since the advisory service may use similar models,
personnel, or data to arrive at their forecasts.In addition,
currency changes are not independent. Therefore, our resultsfor
each service aggregated across currencies are valid only if the
independence assumption is satisfied.
The aggregated results suggest that several currencies have
superior track records. For example, for service 9 at the one-
month horizon 92 of 153 forecasts (or 60%) were correct. The
impliedvalueof p1, underthenull hypothesis is 0.6%. For service
1 at the twelve-month horizon, 20 of 27 forecasts (or 74%) were
correct. Theimpliedvalue of p1 under the null hypothesis is 2.1%.23.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Financial theory allows for the possibility that investors
may earn unusual returns relative to those generally available in
the market. In order to earn unusual returns, investors must
have access to information or analytical skills that are not
generally available and reflected in market prices. While this
is a theoretical possibility, it is not likely in a highly
competitive market.
The empirical section of this paper analyzed the accuracy
of a wide range of foreign exchange forecasts prepared by
advisory rvices. Our purpose was both to examine the accuracy
of these forecasts and to measure the speculative profits based
on these forecasts. Based on analysis of mean squared errors,
our resulü suggest that most forecasts are not as accurate as
the forward rate.
Our analysis of the speculative returns and the fraction of
"correct" forecasts, however, does suggest that advisory services
have beaten the forward rate in the past. The record of correct
forecasts and percent of perfect information profits are too
good for some services to be explained by chance. These unusual
results aremore convincing for services with a long track record.
It should be cautioned that if the forward rate contains
a risk premium, then we expect advisory service models to beat the
forward rate according to the tests we have outlined. In this
case we must measure speculative returns relative to a risk
measure. While advisory service forecasts may lead to profits,
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11n the case where risk neutral firms can trade forward
exchange contracts at a price equal tothe expected future spot
rate, Baron (1976) demonstrateSthat there is no welfare loss from
exchange rate uncertainty. Consequently,in our example, the
owners of information will receive anincome transfer from the rest
of the world. (The forward market is a zero sumgame). However,
if investors are risk averse, the productionof accurate informa-
tion should reduce uncertainty aboutfuture relative prices. In-
creased trade in goods and capital resultsin an increase in world
income.
2A highly informative and readable survey of foreign exchange
advisory services is in Euromoney, August1978.
3The importance of prediction is stressed by Friedman (1953)
who states "the only relevant test ofthe validity of a hypothesis
is comparison of its predictions with experience."With respect
to econometric prediction, christ (1951)makes the stronger state-
ment that "The ultimate test of aneconometric model.., comes
with checking its predictions."
4Twoearlierpapers have reported on the accuracyof advisory
service forecasts. ling (1978) aggregatedforecasts across advisory
services to form a simple average "professional"forecast. During
the seven quarter period 1976-I to 1977-Ill,the professional fore-
cast was superior to the forward rateforecast only for the 1DM.
Xing suggested that this is a surprisingresult since the 1DM market
is very active and speculatorsshould act so that the information
in the forecast is quickly reflected inthe forward rate. An
alternative explanation, which we consi4erfurther in section II,
is that speculators are risk averseand as a result the forward rate
is not necessarily the best publiclyavailable forecast.Goodman (1979) analyzed both medium-term, economic oriented
advisory services and short-term technical advisoryservices. While
the former group appeared no more accurate than theforward rate, Good-
manconcludedthat the technical services could lead to large profits
following a daily trading strategy. "(The technically-oriented
services') consistently very strong predictive performance supports
the view that speculative runsdooccur in the exchange market and
thatthe foreign exchange market is not efficient."
5See, for example, Fama(1970)and Black (1971).
6This is essentially a restatement of the semistrong form
tests of asset market efficiency which positsthat prices reflect
publicly available information. One straightforwardtest of this
hypothesis is reported in Scholes (1972).
70n. important study in this regard was by Jensen (1968)
who concluded that professionall)' managed mutualfunds did not
in general achieve unusual returns relative tothe risk and
management costs incurred. The generaldecline in stock market
prices (in real terms) over this periodalso helped to tarnish
the image of professionalism and expertise.
8These assumptions include continuous trading, no transaction
costs and no information costs. Theefficientmarket hypothesis
4oes allow for heterogeneous expectations, but the algebraic foi-
mulation and empirical testing of a model with heterogeneous ex-
pectations is considerably more complex.p-3
9We should note that we are considering information purchases
only for the purpose of "picking winners or beating themarket."
Investors who do not wish to do this will still require someinfor-
mation to match a portfolio to their risk preferences.
10As a theoretical matter, even thislattercase requires fur-
ther qualification. Other investors may imitate the trader with
expertise and in doing so lower his profits. Alternatively,traders
without expertise may lose over time and leave the market so that
the trader with expertise comes to dominate and become the market.
For a detailed discussion of these issues, see aaiffa and
Schaifer (1968), especially Chapter 6.
l2 p(O.5, the advisory service has no expertise. But in
this case, investors can simply reverse the advisory service
recommendations.
23At the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, interest earning U.S.
Treasury bills are acceptable to meet margin requirements.
141f the investor owns a U.S. dollar asset, he must sell it
and give up return i.
15Dooley and Shafer (1976) recognize this point in their analysis.
6The "Modern Theory" approach popularized by Grubel (1966)
presents a partial equilibrium model. Speculators areassumed to be
risk averse although there is no operational model for estimating
the foreign exchange risk premium.
More recent papers by Roll and Solnik (1977) and Grauer,F- 4
Litzenberger, and Stehie (1976) present a general equilibrium
framework, but there is disagreement about how, or if, these
models canbemade operational. See the discussion in the
Journal of Finance, May 1977.
17As in our earlier test for forecasting expertise, we must a
assume the probability of correct prediction is constant over time.
In addition, however, we must assume that the distribution of
speculative returnsisconstant over time. Whenthisassumption
is not met, the H-statistic can give misleading results. For
example, suppose a forecasting service provides incorrect forecasts
in nine consecutive preiods, however in each period the loss is
sma-1 ($.01 per contract)0 Assume further that in period ten the
service correctly predicts a large exchange rate change ($.41).
Judging by the H-statistic (H$.32 actual profit /$.S0potential
profit -64%),the advisory service is doing an admirable job.
However the probability of correct advise in any single period is
low (p •r/n—0,10)and significantly worse than guessing.
18The problem of selecting an historical set of spot rates
to represent the market price brings into focus the issue of
selecting a róasonable standard for assessing forecasting accuracy.
We have observed that exchange rates sometimes trade within. a 1% or
2% dailyrange;recently for the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen,
the range has a-preached 4%-5%. For example, on January 1 at 9:00
a.m., the three-month forward rate may be $2.00. On April 1 at 9:00
a.m. the spot rate may by $2.00 and then proceed to close at $2.06.
Is this a 3% forecast error even if the trader could have sold hisF-S
position during the day at a favorable rate? For this observation,
the selection of an opening rate, anoon rate or a closing rate
has a great impact on the forecast error. We can add that at any
moment of time, foreign exchange rates also may vary somewhat across
the world's many trading rooms.
9Since the forecast frequency is generally one observation per
month, the one-month panel also represents an independent sample.
20We use the exact binomial calculation for samples smaller
than 18, and the normal approximation otherwise.REFERENCES
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